British Opinion and the Turkish Foreign Policy

(From Lausanne to Mosul: 1923-1926)

I. From Mudanya to the Opening of the Lausanne Conference

The early years of the Kemalist regime were marked by acute tension in Anglo- Turkish relations, a circumstance which was duly reflected in the tone of British press comment on the subject of the "New Turkey". Following the end of the First World War, the British government of Lloyd George had taken the lead in persuading its allies to impose harsh peace terms upon the defeated Ottoman Empire. These terms, embodied in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, envisaged a rump Turkish state in Istanbul and Asia Minor, to be ruled as before by the Ottoman Sultan, but to be subject to a range of financial and military controls by the Great Powers, leaving its independence and sovereignty scarcely more than nominal. In addition, Greece was granted permanent possession of Eastern Thrace, together with the provisional administration of the izmir region of Asia Minor, while it was also proposed to create an Armenian state in eastern Asia Minor. The British likewise took the lead in seeking to enforce the Treaty of Sevres against the opposition of the nascent Turkish national movement, which, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, had formed its own government at Ankara, in the heart of Asia Minor. In particular, the British encouraged the Greeks to advance from their base at Izmir to attack the nationalists. This policy failed. Mustafa Kemal's forces rapidly extinguished the fledgling Armenian state in October 1920, halted the Greek advance at Sakarya in September 1921, and in August 1922 launched a successful offensive which drove all Greek forces from Asia Minor and brought Britain herself to the brink of war. In the event, the British backed down, agreeing at the Mudanya armistice in October 1922 to Mustafa Kemal's demand for the restoration of Eastern Thrace, and conceding that the Treaty of Sevres should be subject to fundamental revision at an international conference, to be held in Lausanne.

There could be no disguising the fact that this outcome represented a serious setback for Britain's foreign policy, and it helped to precipitate the downfall of Lloyd George's coalition cabinet and its replacement by a Conservative administration headed by Bonar Law. Britain was faced by a resurgent Turkish state, whose ultimate political and military objectives remained uncertain. On paper, Mustafa Kemal and his government were bound by the Turkish "National Pact", which envisaged a fully independent and sovereign Turkey, within defined borders embracing Eastern Thrace and the whole of Asia Mnor. This was a limited programme, but the British press was quick to recall the more far-reaching Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islaniic ambitions of Mustafa Kemal's predecessors, the Young Turks and Sultan Abdulhamid. Doubts on this score were reinforced by the close relations which had developed between the Ankara government and Bolshevik Russia, an openly revolutionary state which preached the overthrow of capitalism and of the British Empire. Finally, the British felt themselves to be diplomatically isolated. Initially, they had secured the cooperation of France and Italy in their effort to enforce the Treaty of Sevres, but as the strength of Mustafa Kemal's forces grew steadily more apparent 1921 onwards, both France and Italy had hastened to mend their fences with Ankara.

As early as January 1922, months before the final victory of Mustafa Kemal's forces, the Times had expressed disquiet, asserting in a leading article that it was a supreme necessity that Great Britain and France, by acting in close unison, should impress upon the World of Islam the unity of western civilisation in their policy towards Turkey: "if the spectacle of their activities [France and Great Britain] suggests to the Oriental mind that Europe is sharply divided, the results will be seen in a growing unrest among the many Mahomedan peoples who are under British or French sway".[1] Similarly, the Near East complained that the Allied Governments were approaching the Near Eastern question from entirely different planes, and that to Italy and France it was mainly an economic matter.[2] The Times, however, was convinced that some concessions must be made to the Turks: it called upon the Allies to make peace with Turkey, since such a peace would mean for Great Britain "the beginning of an essential and far reaching reconciliation with the wide and varied World of Islam"; it added that no real peace could be made unless the principle of Turkish sovereignty were completely recognized”.[3]

The decisive Turkish victory in September 1922 provoked much concern. The Nation and Athenaeum summarised the Turk's new position as follows:

flue has been the "Sick Man" to be resuscitated; the dragon to be slain when there was a princess to be rescued; the rich fool to be fleeced; or the bear whose skin was to be divided among the hunters. Suddenly his passivity(which even at its extreme, was by no means the same thing as non-existence) has changed into something very active, and our statesmen appear to be nonplussed by the metamorphosis". The Nation and Athenaeum even suggested that Turkey now enjoyed a position greater than any since the failure of the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, and warned that one thing was certain: the Turks would insist on every jot and tittle of their celebrated "National Pact”.[4]

The conservative press in particular expressed concern at the Ankara government's links with Bolshevik Russia. However, the Contemporary Review stated that Mustafa Kemal disued the Russians, and that he feared Bolshevism: it had been the force of circumstances which had obliged him to adopt a policy of alliance with Moscow'.[5] Still more positive was the New Statesman, which suggested that there was not a single man in the world Eke Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and urged that Turkey be granted Western as well as Eastern Thrace, and accepted as a European power and a member of the League of Nations, so long as it was prepared to give all guarantees necessary for the protection of Christian minorities.[6] The press foresaw tough negotiations. The Near East warned that Great Britain would have to deal with the "Ankara spirit", and that there was no doubt that the Nationalists were inspired by an intense patriotism.[7] This judgement was echoed by the Times: Turkev was coming back to Euro e as a new force, and the new Turk had learned the modern lesson of nationalism: "The energy that inspires him is not religious fervour, but nationalist zeal", awakened by contact and conflict with the West.[8]

Events were moving fast. On 11 October 1922 the Ankara government concluded an armistice with the Allies at Mudanya, providing for the restoration of Eastern Thrace to the Turks, but also stipulating that the Turks must respect the status quo until a final settlement was completed at a conference which was to meet at Lausanne in Switzerland. This offer of a peace conference removed any immediate threat of armed conflict, but also led to a major development on the Turkish side. The Allies issued invitations to the conference to the Nationalist government in Ankara, but also to the Sultan's government in Istanbul. Seeing in this a threat to the Ankara government's authority, Mustafa Kemal responded on I November 1922, by passing a bill through the Ankara Grand National Assembly, deposing the reigning Sultan Vahdettin, formally abolishing the Sultanate, and leaving the Ottoman dynasty in possession of the sole office of the Caliphate.

The British Press reacted with hostility, characterising the abolition of Sultanate and the deposition of the Sultan as a coup d'etat, and an infraction of the Mudanya agreement The Conservative press suggested that Turkey might lose her prestige among the Moslems, and expressed oncern about the future of the Caliphate, emphasizing that Great Britain had Moslem subjects. On the other hand, the Nation and Athenaeum- and the New tatesman thought the British Government was under no obligation to save the Sultan's throne for him. As to the separation of the offices of Caliph and Sultan, the New Statesman stated: "We may regard the breaking up of the Caliphate as a dangerous experiment; but if the Turks, in their modernist zeal, choose to offend the feeling of millions of their fellow Moslems in India and elsewhere, and to take the various political risks that must ensue in the World of Islam, that is their business”.[9]

II.The Lausanne Conference and Treaty

The conference to revise the discredited Treaty of Serves opened at Lausanne on November 20, 1922. It was attended by representatives of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Turkey; the U.S.A. sent an observer. ne Conference established three Commissions, for the purpose of discussing the several groups of questions on its agenda. The first Commission, responsible for territorial and . military questions, was under the presidency of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, and dealt with the issues of the boundary of Eastern Thrace, Turkey's rights at the Straits, and the future of Western Thrace and Mosul, two regions claimed by the National Pact, but as yet outside Turkey's control. The second Commission, charged with examining the interests of foreigners in Turkey, and also with the protection of minorities, was presided over by the Marquis Garroni, the representative of Italy. The third Commission, responsible for financial and economic questions, was presided over by M.Barrare, the representative of France. From the start, the Turkish delegation, headed by General ismet Pasha, insisted on the full implementation of the National Pact, with. its demands for full and unfettered Turkish sovereignty in all domestic matters. Difficulties quickly arose over the issues of non-Turkish minorities in Turkey, over Mosul, and over the Capitulations the legal, fiscal and commercial privileges enjoyed by the subjects of European Powers in the Ottoman Empire.While broadly anxious for peace with the new Turkey, the British press foresaw difficult negotiations ahead, and expressed some nervousness at the militantly nationalist mood of the Ankara government. The New Statesman described Turkey's position as: "a sword in one hand and an olive branch in the other", while the Times in a leading article, stated that "a new Turkey had appeared: a Turkey that took far less account of Islam than of a revived Turkish racial spirit", and warned that if the Turks wanted to return to Europe, they must be more closely associated with the nations of Europe, and should recognise the European principle of the protection of national minorities.[10] Like the other conservatıve newspapers, the Times was fearful of Bolshevik influence upon the Turkish leaders, and thought the Bolsheviks stood behind them: Turkey had been a pawn in German strategy during the First World War, but this time she was serving as an insturment in the hands of those implacable enemies of the British Empire, the Bolsheviks.[11]

These early apprehensions were reinforced by the actual course of the Lausanne negotiations. By January 1923, the conference was deadlocked. The Turkish representives insisted on their National Pact, and the Allies refused the Turkish demands categorically. The outstanding questions were the treatment of minorities, the Capitulations, the freedom of the Straits, the disposal of Western thrace, and Mosul. The uncompromising attitude was not only on the Turkish side; the French delegation insisted upon the Capitulations, and upon full repayment of Turkey’s foreign debts. Lord Curzon warned the Turkish delegation sternly that if they did not do as he told them he would go right home, or otherwise punish them. The Turks courteously replied that they were sorry, but they could not agree.

The Times was not sure whether the Turks had come to Lausanne to make peace or to continue their struggle for complete independence, and it found the Turkish policy of "wait and see" at Lausanne boring.[12] The New Statesman likewise complained of Turkish demands which were not merely technical breaches of the Mudanya Agreement: the denunciation of the Capitulations, the closing of the Mixed Courts, and of foreign Post Offices, the raising of the customs tariff to an incredible figure, and attacks upon foreign schools in Istanbul were unacceptable. The New Statesman stated that it had supported and defended the Turks consistently when they fought for genuine national aims against the injustice of the Treaty of Sevres, and against the aggression of the armies of Greece, but warned that it could not defend the Turks when they turned round upon the very principles which had given them moral support in Europe. The New Statesman described the Ankara policy as "drunken nationalism", and "almost suicidal in character". It believed that the Turks would maintain their preposterous attitude: "They have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by exercising patience for a few days. They have not the slightest reason to fear any trick being played them by the Allies; they can still hope to profit by divergences of interest and differences of opinion round the table of a Peace Conference. But they can expect nothing but disaster by provoking a conflict with the united arms of the three Great Powers. Let Kemal drunk appeal to Kemal sober".[13]

The Daily Telegraph's Istanbul correspondent reported in January 1923 that [14]  "the Turks mean to fight"; similarly, a leading article in the Morning Post found Ankara's policy bellicose, and warned that many members of the Ankara Assembly had been blinded by the dazzling treasures of the Bolsheviks. The Morning Post feared that Mustafa Kemal was looking to the East, and not to the West, to Moscow, not to London. The article asserted that the policy of Ankara was the same as the policy of Abdulhamid at Istanbul, of Lenin in Moscow, and of Dr. Cuno in Berlin: the policy of playing off one ally against the other.[15] This last judgement was echoed by the Daily Telegraph, which suggested that Turkey was trying to play off the powers one against the other, and that the Turks did not understand modem diplomacy: they were acting as though in an Oriental Bazaar.[16]

The Manchester Guardian also found the Turkish government bellicose and ready to fight.[17] On the other hand, a few papers, notably the Daily Herald, and also some Sunday papers, took a different view. The Daily Herald emphasized the war danger,and criticized the British stance at Lausanne,[18] blaming "...all this trouble and expense on the part of our imperialists...”, whose real interest was Mosul's rich oil resources.[19] The Sunday Pictorial was also critical of the Government's policy, particularly over Mosul. In January 1923 it printed an article by Lovat Fraser[20] entitled "Why Should We Hurt Lancashire For The Sake Of Mosul?”[21] which argued that while the world was looking anxiously at the Ruhr Valley, England was slowly and stupidly drifting towards war in Mesopotamia. Fraser continued: "...we have a couple of million people out of work in this Island, though not all of them are registered. When our own countrymen are in such distress why fight about Mosul?"[22]. The Sunday Pictorial's leading article stated that:

"...the whole nation wants to see us out of Mesopotamia, with our troops back at home, and our armoured cars and aeroplanes set to more useful purposes".

Lovat Fraser questioned Lord Curzon's achievement at Lausanne: "Has the accomplished leader of the British House of Lords, the scholarly chancellor of Oxford University, any real reason to be proud of his victory in dialectics over a poor little deaf and unlettered Turkish general?”[23].

Similar view were expressed in the Weekly Dispatch, which, with the Sunday Pictorial, urged several times "Make Peace With Turkey": "why are we protecting Baghdad and leaving the heart of the Empire unprotected? why are we squandering millions abroad to no good and while we cannot afford to protect our own homes and our own flesh and blood?" The Weekly Dispatch's leading article urged a return to the traditional British policy of friendly relations with Turkey, which was essential to the interests of British Empire. It added that all sensible and educated Turks realised that it would be impossible for Turkey to fight with the Allies.[24] The popular press warned that Bonar Law's government was paying for Lloyd George's sins and for his mistaken policy towards the Middle East.

The New Statesman tried to explain Turkish behaviour as a manifestation of "triumphant nationalisms, which was extremely touchy about any foreign intervention and determined to exercise its own rights in its own way.[25] In the New Statesman's view, the Capitulations would have to go, or at any rate, be drastically revised, "if the Angora fanatics who demand 'Turkey for the Turks' determine presently to damage their country by making it too uncomfortable for foreigners".[26] Although the New Statesman argued that Lord Curzon's treatment of the Turks was one cause of the deadlock at Lausanne, it believed that the chief obstacles to a settlement were Ankara, and its representatives' extravagant claims. As to the thorny issue of Mosul, the New Statesman criticized the idea that "there is the oil", and that Britain should stay in Iraq at any cost for the sake of oil. It believed that what kept Britain in Mosul was the fact that Britain was solemnly bound to the protection of Iraq by her mandate from the League of Nation.[27] Another weekly, the Nation and Athenaeum disagreed, and like the Conservative papers, accused Turkey of bluffing, and of playing off one great power against another.[28] Similar opinions were expressed in the Near East.[29]

In sum, at the beginning of 1923 almost every British paper and periodical was inclined to take a hostile view of Turkey: the new Turkey was the same as the old onei and the new leader's policy the same as Abdulhamid's; the Turks were under Russian tutelage, and not able to make an agreement with Great Britain or other powers without Russia's knowledge. All in all the Turks remained a destructive, rather than a constructive, force in the world.[30]

The deadlock at Lausanne proved insuperable, however, and at the beginning of February 1923 the negotiations were formally suspended. In Britain, this provoked much anxious comment. The Times in a leading article, expressed[31] the view that the Turks had come to Lausanne to exploit the differences between Great Britain, France, and Italy, for they had ample experience both of the miscalculations and of the dissensions of the Western Powers. The article noted, however, that it was not with these Powers that the Turks had to make peace. "They are [the Turks] called upon to make their peace with the civilization that may, if they are willing, include them within the sweep of its own strong impulse of progress". The article believed that the offer which had been made at Lausanne was an unexampled and astonishing opportunity for the Turks. "The alternative to the acceptance of this treaty is a return to exhausting conflict, and the sacrifice of the hope of independence to the inexorable demands of Bolshevism". In another leading article, the Times commented that Great Britain had shown her eagerness for a settlement, but the Turks had misjudged opinion in Britain.[32] Interestingly, the Times, the Manchester Guardian, and the Westminster Gazette all opined that the only conceivable explanation of the failure of the Lausanne conference was that Mustafa Kemal and his associates were not masters in their own house: "their judgment is overbome by the ignorant and fanatical peasants they have gathered around them; and it is these men, and not the nominal rulers of Turkey, who have dictated the inept decision at Lausanne".[33]

The Morning Post questioned the new Turkish leaders' policy. On the one hand, the Turks insisted on their sovereignty, and did not want to make any concession to the West. But at the same time, they wanted to modernise their country and were seeking Western aid. 'Me Turks wanted a new jurisprudence and judicial system, and the new Turks had promised the West a different dispensation from that of the old. But in demanding certain guarantees, the Morning Post continued, the Allies were not casting any reflection on the good faith of the new Turkish Regime. The Morning Post gave the example of the Bolsheviks, with whom Lloyd George had made a trade agreement and noted that capitalists were still risking their gold in Bolshevist Russia. It warned the Allied capitalist that without certain conditions trade was unsafe with Turkey.[34] The Morning Post found the new Turks exceedingly sensitive regarding any infringement of Turkey's sovereignty, and any foreign influence in Turkey,[35] and warned that the fact was that if Turkey made her choice on the Western side, then she must accept certain consequences; the West would not or could not trade with the East unless it had a certain minimum guarantee that its own ideas of law and justice would for this purpose be accepted by the East.[36] However, the Morning Post was by now more reassured about Turkey's relations with Russia, and doubted whether they were cordial, or would really succeed. But the Morning Post repeated that Turkish reconstruction was impossible without foreign help, and while it was confident that the new leaders of Turkey knew the reality, and did not trust the Bolshevists and the Germans,[37] almost in the same breath, it accused the Turks of copying the methods of the Bolsheviks.[38]

In a series of articles[39]  in the Westminster Gazette mostly devoted to Turkey's economic prospects, J.A.Spender[40]likewise doubted the effectiveness of Bolshevik pressure on Turkey[41]:"...in all the world there are no two human beings more unlike in their respective outlooks on life, government, and religion than the Turkish Mohemmedan and the Russian Bolshevik."

Immediately before the rupture of negotiations at Lausanne, the Daily Telegraph had recommended that[42] the British Delegation to be generous to Turkey, and put her on her feet again. It was especially concerned at the possibility of a Turkish attack on the British forces in Istanbul and at the Straits Even after the rupture, the Daily Telegraph remained moderate in its attitude, arguing that the economic policy envisaged by Mustafa Kemal would be acceptable, for it was the same as the western economic model, not the Russian.[43] At the same time, like the rest of the conservative press, the Daily Telegraph confinued to criticize the pro-Bolshevik policy of Ankara; it also noted that since the separation of the functions of the Caliphate from those of the Sultanate, Ankara was no longer the uncriticized leader of Islam, and that the new Turks had lost a weapon which the had used against y Great Britain in the past.

The Sunday Pictorial continued to press for peace with Turkey. On February 11, 1923,[44] Lovat Fraser wrote an article in which stated that he believed that the Turks wanted peace at Lausanne, but that they were slow in deciding. On the other hand he complained of the treatment of the Turkish delegates at Lausanne, which he compared to "treating naughty schoolboys". A.Hulme Bearnan[45]questioned Lord Curzon's statement that "England would go to war rather than yield one inch”, noting that " it is dubious if the British citizen would have any pleasure in fighting over Mosul in order to give it to the alien Bedouin chief from the Hedjaz whom England has imposed upon Iraq”. Similarly, an article in the Nineteenth Centurey and After entitled "Turkey”[46] criticized the treatment of Turkey, and accused the British delegates of failing to recognise the Turks as nation of at least the same calibre as Portugal or Paraguay; the trouble was that the British delegates had in mind the old idea of the "Sick man of Europe". The Saturday Review drew attention to the danger to the Middle East and pointed out that the Allies had to take into account something new and strange, yet portentous, in the Nationalism of Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara Assembly, the basis and spirit of which were really formidable.[47]

Following the suspension of the Lausanne negotiations'on 4 February 1923, the British press was almost unanimous that Turkish obduracy was to blame. Some papers atuibuted this to Bolshevik pressure; others placed the responsibility on extremists in the Ankara Assembly. New Witness[48] saw the Turks' intractability as being "in the nature of a veritable Revolt of Islam ...... The.Economist was prepared to concede that Mustafa Kemal and ismet Pasha were moderate and genuine Turkish nationalists, but it warned that a nationalist outlook brought some disadvantages, pointing to the Turks' insistence upon their extreme national programme[49]conceming finance and the rectification of frontiers. The Economist believed, however, that if these issues could be settled, there was no reason why nationalist Turkey should not live peacefully in the same world with the British Empire.[50] The Daily Telegraph noted that Turkish soldiers distrusted and disued Bolshevism, and the subservience to Moscow of the political extremists, and that some of the Turkish military leaders, although they might not love the British Empire, had a wholesome respect for it. But the Daily Teleuaph believed that the real "peace Party" could be found among the more enlightened and sober members of the older generation of Young Turks.[51]

Others attributed the Turks' intractability to their bargaining tactics. The Times's special correspondent in Ankara complained of, "dealing with an Asiatic people who do not understand the rules of western diplomacy, and who regard each fresh concession as a sign of weakness, instead of fair give-and-take".[52] The Spectator accused Mustafa Kemal of deliberately giving rein to his extremists in order to impress the Allies,[53] while the Nation and Athenaeum suggested that the Turks had been playing their traditional policy at the conference, at first fishing successfully in the troubled waters between Russia and Britain, and then fishing in the troubled waters between Britain and France.[54] The Spectator was not sure whether Mustafa Kemal's government was genuinely working for the salvation of the Turkish race, or whether it was a group of adventurers bent on exploiting international chaos to their own advantage.[55] The Daily Mail stated that the Turks regarded themselves as a victorious and much injured race: "they have almost forgotten Lord Allenby's march through Syria, but they remember very vividly how they armed themselves and flung the Greeks into the Sea”.[56] Only the New Statesman took the view that the British side might be responsible for the breaking up the Lausanne negotiations. In first place, it believed that Turkey was not determined to make Britain the arch-enemy, secondly, it thought Britain was playing the Price for a long course of tricky intrigues and broken Promises given during the First World War and its aftermath. It argued that it was Lord Curzon's treatment of the Turks which was the prime cause of the deadlock, describing Curzon as "the champion of the disastrous policy,,. However, the New Statesman agreed that the Turks were making extravagant claims, because their insensate nationalism drove them to cut off their nose to spite their face.[57]

In February 1923, the Daily Mail sent a correspondent, G.Ward Lattice,[58] to Turkey. In Ankara, Ward Price interviewed Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and also Rauf Bey,[59] the prime minister. Ward Price judged that the Turks wanted to live in peace on good terms with Britain, and with the Allies. He found Rauf Bey understanding of the Allies' point of view, and professing strong sympathies for Britain. Ward Price assured him there was a strong and sincere desire in Britain to see Turkey fully independent, but Rauf Bey replied:

"When I had signed it [the Moudros Armistice], I told Admiral Calthorpe that I had done so because I trusted the good faith of the British nation. He was much moved, shook me by the hand, and then, turning to his officers, he said: 'it is true, isn't it gentlemen, that England always, keeps her word?'. As one man they answered 'yes'. Yet it was only a few months later that the armistice of Moudros was broken under the protection of the very guns of Admiral Calthorpe's flagship by the landing of Greek at Smyrna".

As to the financial disputes at Lausanne, Rauf Bey commented:

"We see the Allies trying to keep their foot inside our door, and continue their financial tutelage of Turkey, after making a pretence of leaving the house entirely..."

Rauf Bey was in favour of peace, but warned the British that: "You can never govern the East by trying to dominate Turkey; but if we are your friends your difficulties will disappear". Ward Price reported that the Turks were demanding independence, but that, at the same time they did not want to obtain it at the cost of a humiliation for the Allies.[60]

Nine days later Ward Price had an interview with Mustafa Kemal, who defmed the Turkish point of view as follows:

"Have you met anyone here who does not want peace? The difficulty seems to be, that the Western Powers persist in thinking that they are dealing with the old Ottoman Empire. They do not realise that a New Turkey has replaced

the old, a Turkey different not only in the form of its Government, but also in its national spirit ... She asks no more than the same measure of independence which European powers claim for themselves, but to achieve this she is ready to sacrifice her last man".

Ward Price alluded to the foreign loans, which would doubtless be necessary for the improvement and development of the new Turkey. Mustafa Kemal answered:

"...The Old Imperial Ottoman Government constantly made the fatal mistake of borrowing beyond its resources, and so gave foreign States the opportunity to establish that financial domination over Turkey, which has been so fatal to the country. It was in this way that the 'Ottoman Public Debt', an institutions that entrenches so deeply upon the financial independence of Turkey, came into being. We are determined to avoid such financial shackles in the future. We shall need the help of foreign capital and welcome it, but it must be on terms which completely safeguard our sovereignty within our dominions..."

Ward Price observed that the Turks sincerely believed that the Lausanne Peace Treaty was sown with traps for their feet, and that they thought Europe wanted a policy of economic slavery of Turkey". He informed his readers: "No one can meet this still young chief of state without feeling respect and adniiration for his qualities. Its strong will, his cool, objective brain, his level-headed sanity, and his modesty mark him out as one of the great men of his time. It will be a tragedy if the statesman of Europe fail to secure such a man and the people he leads as friends instead of enemies"[61].

Ward Price's theme of the "New Turkey" was taken up by other newspapers. The Times, with marked scepticism, criticized Turkish political standards, and stated "Turkey must choose which she is going to adopt ... if they really wanted to modemise their country they must adopt the obligations as well as the catch words of modem politics. Otherwise they will never become Europeanized"[62]. Against this, the Manchester Guardian found the new Turks more reasonable than the old ones, and characterised Mustafa Kemal Pasha as a “democrat”.[63] In the Daily Mail Ward Price returned to his theme: a new Turkey had come into existence, with an intense national consciousness and a spirit of active patriotism, and the new Turkey was modemising itself as fast as its poverty would allow.[64] In a similar spirit, Lovat Fraser argued in the Sunday Pictorial that the Turks were a new nation, created by Lloyd George's wrong policy. Lovat Fraser condemned people like Lord Curzon, who were thinking of a Turkey of fifty years ago.[65] The Sunday Pictorial's proprietor Lord Rothermere[66]intervened to express concern about Great Britain's policy towards the Moslem world, and about business arrangements in Turkey. He suggested that the right policy was to "make peace with Turkey", and to convince the Moslem world that Britain was not hostile to Moslem interests.[67] A leading article in the Weekly Dispatch was also in favour of peace with Turkey, and criticised Lloyd George's cabinet: "This country has already suffered enough by the blunders and follies of the late government". It was also concerned for British prestige: "As a Moslem Power, our presige, it is to be feared, has not been enhanced”[68].

The socialist Daily Herald went further, complaining of Greek influence in Britain's Foreign Office,[69] and of "Business Haggling At Lausanne", "which will in the long run be provided, and paid for by the Anatolian peasantry, whose future will be bought and sold and haggled over at the bars and in the lounges of the Lausanne hotels during the next few weeks"[70]. The Daily Herald was also supportive of the Turks' insistence upon economic and financial independence. An article by Sir Ernest Nathaniel Bennet[71] argued that the Turks were not emulating the example of the Western nations, by seeking to put a ring fence round their resources. Their door was open to honest traders, but the Turk refused to be treated any longer as a kind of colonial dumping ground for European financiers: " the new spirit of Turkey is utterly weary and sick of this tutelage and tyranny; rather than go back to the old days of economic bondage they will fight to the last man". Bennet stated that British labour must say: "we will not tolerate a fresh war for the sake of British or foreign financiers”.[72]

Writing in the Contemporary Review, however, A.J.Toynbee[73] warned that Turkey would soon have to come to terms with Western Europe, because without foreign loans she could not continue to finance her army. In that case her future would be similar to her recent past, and "She will sink again from being a player to being a pawn. It remains to be seen whether she will be an English pawn this time or a Russian one"[74].

Writing in the Nineteenth Century and After, A.Hulme Beaman[75] argued that: "At every turn in present foreign policy lie in ambush the hideous dragons of Bolshevism and Communism, which regard.England as their only serious and deadly foe in the world. Can it be good business to throw Turkey into the arms of Russia or Germany,or both? The Turks have no love for Russia, but on the contrary, an ever-present fear. Yet we have repeatedly forced them to accept assistance and alliance from the Soviets. For whose sake? Certainly not our own”.[76]

Winston S.Churchill pointed out in the Empire Review, "We must have a stable peace with Turkey... All our enterprises and interests in the Middle East require a peace with Turkey. Without such a peace, increasing unrest and an increasing expense are inevitable ... But an abject peace, based upon a confession of British impotence, and accompanied by lively demonstrations of alarm on our part, amid a chorous of humble expostulations, would undoubtedly ruin our reputation and our position, not only in Middle East, but throught the Orient as greatly as would an unsuccessful war". Winston Churchill criticized the popular press: "Our representatives at Lausanne have been cruelly hampered and weakened by repeated declarations in large portions of the British Press that no demands, however outrageous, that no provocation, however flagrant; no injuries, however grave, would in any circumstances be resented or resisted by Great Britain”[77].

In the event, negotiations at Lausanne resumed on 23 April 1923, and the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed on 24 July 1923, on terms which conceded many of Turkey's demands. In the treaty itself the most important clauses were those dealing with the new frontiers of Turkey, the redistribution of the Ottoman Public Debt, the abolition of the Capitulation system and the protection of minorities and exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece. Turkey got the whole of Eastern Thrace, while Istanbul was placed under the full sovereignty and administration of the Turkish government, with the right to maintain a Turkish garrison in the city. Safeguards with respect to the use of the Straits, both in time of war and in time of peace, were stipulated in a special Straits Convention annexed to the main Peace Treaty. The southern boundary of Turkey under the Lausanne treaty practically confirmed the boundary settlement stipulated in the Franco-Turkish Agreement in October 1921. The south-east boundary of Turkey including the question of Mosul, was left to be negotiated between Turkey and Great Britain: the two parties agreed to seek a settlement by direct discussion, with resort to the League of Nations in case no agreement was reached at the end of nine months. After the signature of the Treaty, the British Press became more understanding of Turkey, and began to consider more seriously the Ankara Government and its leader. The Observer warned that it was pointless to speak of "the unspeakable and the incurable Turk" any more[78]: Turkey had become more reasonable, and the leader of Turkey had become a peaceful administrator, who was leading the country from its primitive and undeveloped condition towards modem standards of national prosperity. In similarly positive tones, the Westminster Gazette noted that patience and realistic goodwill had achieved a peace between the Allies and Turkey at Lausanne: "Turkey obtains a definite place in Europe, and it was never Mr.Gladstone's 'bag and baggage' policy to turn her out of Constantinople, as some anti-Turks have so often contended". It believed that for the future Britain's main interest would be the freedom and security of trade in Turkey.[79]

Other newspapers, too, characterised the treaty as a kind of "Charter of Liberty", which recognised Turkey as an active and equal member of international society. The Manchester Guardian commented that die Turkish Government had got rid of the Sultan in internal affairs; thanks to the treaty, it had got rid of the Foreign Powers in external affairs.[80] The Over Seas Daily Mail declared that the Treaty began a new era in Britain's relations with the Turks: the Turks were now treated as an equal friend, a return to the old conservative policy of an amicable understanding with Turkey.[81] The Economist preferred a policy of wait and see, but accepted that the result of the Lausanne conference was a Turkish victory, pointing out, however, that Turkey had not gained complete independence from the West, while the West itself had lost some prestige in Turkey. The Manchester Guardian and the Economist pointed out that the Lausanne Treaty was the first genuinely negotiated peace treaty to result from the First World War: the Turks had sat at the table on a footing of equality with the other Powers, and every article of the Treaty was debated and explained to the Turks, not by "brandishing the big stick”[82]. The Times stated the Treaty opened a new chapter for Turkish history, and gave Turkey a position in the world which she had never held before, enhancing her respect among the other Muslim countries.[83] The Times, and the Near East, expressed mixed opinions. On the one hand, they agreed that the Turks had a right to become master of their own home, but both criticized the Turkish policy of complete independence, and the rejection of outside assistance. In addition, with the Greco-Turkish population exchange now agreed, they were concerned about the Christian minorities in Turkey. The Near East described Turkey's new policy as "the policy of hatred of the foreigner"[84]. The Times thought that the ideal of most Turks was no doubt to get rid of minorities and European interference in all forms, and to live comfortably in their traditional way. But it warned that this kind of policy would mean disaster for Turkey: the Turks could do nothing without the Christian minorities, without foreign loans, and without the trust of the other powers. Almost every British newspaper questioned the Turkish policy of population exchange with Greece, believing that Turkey had thereby lost the most intelligent, and most industrious elements of the population. The question was asked several times: "how would the Turks replace the Greek and Armenian skills?"[85].

The signature of the Lausanne Treaty did alleviate British suspicions of Bolshevik influence on the Turkish government. Before and during the Lausanne negotiations, most papers believed as a matter of fact that the Turkish Government was thoroughly Bolshevist in its interpretation of international agreements, but the Daily Express stated that the Lausanne Treaty showed Turkey not to recognise any decisions which were not in its favour.[86] The Times's Near East correspondent observed that Turkish relation with Russia were no longer so cordial as they had been: "there is a certain school of thought which would Re Turkey, resigning herself to virtual territorial exclusion from Europe, to seek her expansion almost entirely in Asia and particularly towards the Caucasus. Such a policy would sooner or later bring her into conflict with Russia, and she would therefore like to have a friendly England on her South"[87].

This view was partially echoed by J.A.Toynbee, in an article in the Nineteenth Century and After, entitled "Angora And The British Empire In The East"[88].

Toynbee argued that "The Turks have not been looking to Russia for anything but munitions, diplomatic support and goid,...The Turks aim to become a member of the Western community of nations, not the Third International, and Turkey has turned her face to the West...".

In the months following the Lausanne treaty most British papers and periodicals continued to speculate about the future of Turkish economic policy, and the prospects for British trade and investment in Turkey. Like other Conservative papers, the Morning Post was of the opinion that the new Ankara regime put politics very much above economics,[89] and did not want to see any more foreigners work to their own financial detriment.[90] Ile Morning Post noted that the Turks were authorising foreign capital, foreign schools, and foreign entrepreneurs, but stressed that the new Turkish attitude towards foreign capital and enterprises was shaped by a "new nationalist spirit"[91]. The Times was concerned about British businesses in Turkey, suggesting that the "Turks must learn to walk before they can run, it may take some time". The Times repeated the conunon belief that the Turks were quite incapable of any business capacity, thought the current Turkish xenophobia would eventually die, and that Turkey would see reality and give assurances to foreign investments.[92]

Writing in the Quarterly Review William Miller[93]agreed with this view of the Turkish character, and pointed out that[94]the Turks were good fighters but poor administrators, and that there was no differences between the "old", and the "new" Turks. The Manchester Guardian quoted Lord Curzon, who alluded to the economic provisions of the Lausanne Treaty in a speech at an Imperial Conference in October 1923,[95] warning that the chief sufferer would not be the foreign community but Turkey herself. "I think that she will experience great disillusionment and many disappointments, and some of the fruits which she claims to have garnered will turn out to be Dead Sea apples in her mouth. But in making what will be a great experiment she starts with a complete absence of resentment on our part and with the sincere expression of our goodwill".

Although the Times was not sure whether Turkey's economic policy would change, abandoning xenophobia and encouraging the return of foreign enterprise and foreign capital.[96] The Times and the were both worried about the Ottoman debt, and'thought that Turkey aimed at a veiled repudiation of the debt.[97] At Lausanne, Turkey had agreed to pay the -Ottoman debt, but some argument was going on between the Turkish Government and France about the payment. Moreover both papers were concerned about the elimination of Christian minorities from all services in Turkey.[98]

Nevertheless the Times[99] was in favour of establishing close and friendly relations with Turkey. But the @@tato@r commented on Turkey's investment position, and found that it was not suitable for the investment of British capital.[100]

The British press did not really believe that Turkey was capable of economic reconstruction without borrowing fresh capital and technique from the West.[101]

Although, writing in Foreign Affairs, A.J.Toynbee[102] was not sure whether Turkey would accept foreign assistance or not, he noted that Turkey had become a devotee of the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty, which was also an original Western idea. Toynbee thought that Turkey appeared to be sacrificing her economic recovery to her political principles, but he believed that the new Turkey was not "dazzled" by her recent military success.

III. The Mosul Dispute

The Lausanne Conference had left one major territorial issue outstanding: namely, whether the former Ottoman vilayet of Mosul should be awarded to Turkey, or included within the frontiers of the British mandate of Iraq. The Turkish government pressed its case on two grounds. First, Mosul had been under Ottoman control at the end of the First World War, and its subsequent occupation by British forces was a clear violation of the 1918 Mondros (Mudros) Armistice. Second, Turkey's claim to Mosul was enshrined in the National Pact which defined the objectives of the Turkish War of Independence. The issue was given added salience by the fact that the Mosul region contained valuable petroleum resources.

The question of Mosul had been placed on the agenda of the Lausanne Conference, but no agreement was reached, and it was eventually agreed to insert the following

text in article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty: "The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in a friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months of the coming into force of the Treaty. In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of territories of which the ultimate fate will depend upon that decision". In accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, talks opened in Istanbul on 19 May 1924, between Turkish and British delegates; these lasted until 9 June 1924, but reached no definite conclusion. A lengthy period of deadlock followed.[103]

As a result, during 1924 the British Press became increasingly critical of Turkey: once again Turkey was accused of obduracy, Turkish foreign policy was dismissed as incomprehensible, and fated to political and strategic isolation, and some papers suggested that the Turks were ready to fight again. The Observer saw this as a bad policy for Turkey, making her a number of enemies.[104]

The Conservative press drew particular attention to rumours that Italy harboured aggressive intentions towards Turkey, and Turkey was urged several times by the British press to make good relations with Great Britain. The Times noted that "it is obvious that the menace to the independence of Anatolia is not yet very great"[105]. Also the Times complained that Turkish policy over the Mosul dispute was aggressive.[106]

During 1924, the Daily Herald disagreed with the other British papers over Mosul, particularly with the Tory press: "it is not being made easier by the rhetorical talk of a 'Turkish Outrage' and so on which has began in the Tory Press"[107]. The Morning Post criticized the current Labour Government's[108]policy towards Turkey for being idealistic, and recommended the British government to get tough with Turkey, as this was the only language the East could understand.[109]

The Turks' seemingly obdurate attitude attracted much comment in the British press, much of it centring on speculation that Ankara must be receiving encouragement from Moscow. The Morning Post again paid attention[110]to Turkey's relations with Russia, and warned the Turks not to forget the Russians' ambitions to possess Istanbul.

The Times was fairly cautious. It conceded that throughout the period of the Turkish War of Independence against the Greeks, Russia had made full use of its opportunity for winning over the Turks, by offering them munitions, partly with the intention of helping to inflict humiliation upon the Western Powers. But the Times added that after the complete success of the Turkish Nationalists over the Greeks, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, Ankara had taken up a less dependent attitude towards Moscow.[111] The Times was confident that Turkey's foreign policy was not to enter into too close relations with any power, and to be impartial with the whole world.[112]

The Daily Telegraph was less sanguine. In March 1925, it noted reports that[113]Turkey and Poland were a discussing Military Entente between themselves and Rumania, even while the Turkish Government was also insisting upon its uncompromising policy over Mosul. The Daily Telegraph thought[114]this must be due to Soviet support, and to a promise from Moscow of unlirlljted financial and military support for Turkey. The Morning Post similarly accused Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy of relying on Soviet Russia, and flinging away the allegiance to the Moslem World.[115] The Morning Post again stressed the danger from Russia and stated "...if there were any statesmanship left to Turkey she would rather seek the friendship than incur the hostility of the British Empire"[116].

Other commentators feared that Britain's own attitude over Mosul carried the risk of throwing the Turks into the arms of the Russians. Writing in the Westminster Gazette, J.A.Spender noted that "if the Turks throw in their lot with the East, and join the Bolsheviks against the West, then this could mean a disaster and trouble for Europe in Asia". Spender added that he did not believe in any long intimacy between Russia and Turkey, and that Mustafa Kemal would not for a moment tolerate communism in Turkey.[117]

During this period most British newspapers and periodicals mentioned that the Turks were worried by the recommendation of the League of Nations that the Kurds in the Mosul area should enjoy a special regime under the British Mandate. For Turkey this would mean the neighbouring Kurds in Turkish territory would be thereby prompted to claim a similar privilege within the boundaries of Turkey. The Turks were nervous of the separatist tendencies of their Kurdish subjects, it was suggested, and felt that the only way of effectively curbing their activities was to control as much of Kurdish Iraq as possible.[118]

The conservative press was particularly critical of Turkish policy. The Daily Telezraph complained that the "Turkish Government changed lots of things but they have not changed their methods in diplomacy, they are keeping in the days of Abdulhamid"[119]. The Morning Post believed that the authorities in Turkey had successfully worked uppublic feeling to a point where it would regard the possession of Mosul as a question of life and death for Turkey.[120] As at the time of the Lausanne negotiations, the Daily Telegrai)h warned the Turks that "if they refuse to accept agreement with Great Britain they would close the last door against the loan”[121] , of which the Turkish leaders were in such urgent need for the rebuilding of their country. The conservative press urged the Turkish leaders to remember that there was no country where they could find a loan except Great Britain: London was the only market which was really in a position to give Turkey loans.

The liberal press viewed the situation differently[122]: the Manchester Guardian argued that the Turks did not see Iraq as Iraq or the League of Nations as the League of Nations, but saw Iraq as a British campaign directed against their internal security and true independence, and the League as a mere concert of Great Powers, still unconverted to a just opinion of Turkey. Writing in the Observer J.L.Garvin[123] warned that[124]Mosul would be another Chanak crisis for Great Britain; he complained that Britain was continuing the attempt to conduct post-war affairs on the basis of pre-war ideas, and asserted that the grounds for Gladstonian hostility towards the old Sultanate were dead, and gone for ever. These new Turks were no longer dominant over Christian minorities, and the new Turk had a right to national existence, as had any country in Europe. Garvin was in favour of establishing a permanent good relationship with the new Turkey. The Observer maintained this stance, arguing that the Turks intended to be friendly with Great Britain, and stressing that “...good relations with Turkey are essential to the peace and prosperity of India...”[125]. Less forthright was the New Statesman, which emphasized its considerable respect. for the new Turkey, and for the genius of Mustafa Kemal,and its support for the Turks' fight for their rights against Greece; nonetheless, the New Statesman believed Turkey's policy over Mosul was wrong.[126] The Fortnightly Review took a similar line, pointing to the Turkish soldiers' good qualities, but criticising Turkish policy over Mosul.[127]

The Daily Herald, again, was the only British paper which held a different view,accusing British diplomacy of playing the traditional game of isolating Turkey and building a coalition against her.[128] Some Ietnents in the popular press, too, continued to regard the Mosul dispute as pointless from Britain's point of view, and urged the government to evacuate not only Mosul but Iraq entirely.[129]

The latter suggestion provoked sharp criticism from the English Review, where Charles Gore,[130]recently returned from visiting Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, noted that: "if in this new crisis arising in Iraq, we show ourselves unable or unwilling to stand up to Turkey, it is not very easy to exaggerate the loss of prestige we should suffer there and elsewhere, especially in Egypt and Syria"[131]. The Engli3h Review criticized the popular press for exaggerating the expenditure caused by Iraq: it was not true that the British public had been compelled to waste minions of pounds in Iraq in order to satisfy the whims of Britain's ill-informed or unscrupulous newspaper proprietors, and British evacuation of the Mosul would not remove the present causes of friction between Great Britain and Turkey: "Turkey does not, in reality, require Mosul, there is no apparent reason why our remaining there should lead to hostilities unless the Turks become unduly inflamed by the propaganda of their friends in this country"[132].

On December 16, 1925, the Council of the League of the Nations ruled that Mosul should remain within the frontiers of the British mandate of Iraq. Initially, the Turkish government stated that it did not accept the decision, but by the beginning of 1926, much of the tension had gone out of the Mosul issue. The Morning Post accused Mustafa Kemal of bluffing both the English and his own people, and using diplomatic resources to calm down the people, who had been roused to a high pitch over the Mosul question. Mustafa Kemal had taken war pictures off the screen, and was now showing views of conference tables and hard working negotiations.[133] The Manchester Guardian shared the same view as the Morning Post, and stated that there was no public opinion or public feeling in Turkey to react to the Mosul dispute, except what was created by the Turkish govemment.[134] These kind of perceptions were shared by the Daily Express which thought Turkey's attitude towards Great Britain was not hostile, and that the leaders of Turkey wanted to return to good relations with Great Britain: the Turkish leaders recognised that having the West for a friend was more advantageous, and there was not any sign that Soviet Russia would succeed in making a tool of Turkey, where Bolshevik influence had been minimized.[135]

One fresh source of concern for the conservative press was the Treaty of Friendship which was signed between Russia and Turkey on 17 December 1925: they saw the Treaty as being directed against the West, and a counter-move to the Locamo Pact, signed on December 1, 1925, between England, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium. The conservative press suggested that the League of Nations' verdict in the Mosul dispute had caused the close relationship between Russia and Turkey: "The Treaty was a rallying of the holy East against the impious West.[136] But the New Statesman found the Russo-Turkish treaty purely pacific and not directed against anyone, and suggested that there were fundamental differences between Russia and Turkey, and both were playing their own hands.[137]

Among the few British observers to suggest that Turkey's desire for Mosul might reflect more than blind nationalism was J.M.Kenworthy.[138] in an article in the Sunday Referee, he discussed the Turkish claim in some detail, suggesting that Turkey's motives were partly economic, partly political. The economic motive, he suggested, was the natural desire to exploit the Mosul oilfields. The political motive was concern with Turkey's Kurdish population, and he commented "...we can assure them that we have no designs on their integrity of the remaining Turkish territory, and will give no encouragement to Kurdish intrigues"[139]. But the Daily Express' special correspondent in Ankara was sceptical of the supposed economic motive, noting that the Turks had previously offered to leave economic control of the Mosul oil fields to British enterprise.[140]

In June 1926 Turkey formally renounced her claim to Mosul. Thereafter, the hostile tone of British press comment changed. Conservative, liberal and other British newspapers generally found Turkey friendly, and were confident that the new Turkey had no aggressive designs or foreign aspirations. Mustafa Kemal was praised for having shown great moderation. The Westminster Gazette noted that the Turks had resigned themselves to the loss of a great part of the old Ottoman Empire, and that the new Turkey's ideal was to become a purely Turkish state, living at peace with her neighbours.[141] Writing in the Sunday Review, J.M.Kenworthy stated that there was nothing more to inflame the spirit of patriotic nationalism, and the more sober- niinded Turkish statesman realised that it was in their best interest to be on good terms with Britain. He continued: "if Turkey pursues peaceable courses and carries out a sober and friendly policy they will deserve help and encouragement from the British people"[142]. In another article in the Nation and Athenaeum, entitled "The Turks and the British Empire"[143], Kenworthy stressed that the strategic position of Turkey was important, and that a friendly Turkey would mean the extension of the power of the British Fleet into the Black Sea. A friendly Turkey would also make Britain's relations easier with her Moslem subjects in India. The signature of the W Mosul treaty, he added, was a set-back to the ambitions of two other nations: W  Mussolini's dream of a great Italian colony in Asia Minor under the Italian flag remained a dream; whilst Russia could no longer count upon Turkey as one of her satellites.

The former suspicion of Turkey's ties with Bolshevik Russia was fading. The Times claimed that the Turks had changed their foreign policy, and that they wanted to become a member of t   he League of Nations.[144] But the Times thought a powerful influence had been brought against Turkey's entry into the League by Soviet Russia.[145] The Morning Post, describing Mustafa Kemal as "ultra-realisfic", believed that Ankara would no longer allow Moscow patronage or propaganda, and that Mustafa Kemal's policy was "...to establish the country in a firm and ftiendly isolation from all Great Power influences...”.[146] This judgement was echoed by the Manchester Guardian: the goal of Turkish foreign policy was to be inde endent, and p not tie Turkey's hands, which were always ready to pick up any advantage that changing circumstances let fall. At the same time, the Manchester Guardian added, Turkey intended to be a friend of Russia.[147]

The Daily Telegraph characterised Turkey as an important element for Britain's future relations with Asia, for the new Turkey would be the leader and spearhead of the new Asia.[148] But the Daily Telegraph was not sure all this could be done without foreign schools or foreign money.

Writing in the Overseas Daily Mail, C.Price noted that the 1921 Constitution granted full power to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, a single chamber parliament, which directly appointed Ministers, and could change them at its pleasure. Price believed the constitution was largely of Mustafa Kemal's own drafting, and reported that he had personally asked Mustafa Kemal "whether when Turkey is again at peace, he would remodel it on the lines of most other democratic nations, with two Houses of Parliament and a Ministry responsible to them, but under the independent control of a Prime Minister." Mustafa Kemal had replied that not only did he not think it necessary that the Turkish system should be changed, but also that he considered it the only really effective manner of administering the sovereignty vested in the people. He believed that England and other democratic nations would themselves adopt such a single-chamber Government. He continued: "We have tried both despotic and constitutional monarchy in Turkey, and they have brought the country to the lowest ebb of its fortunes. Our new single Chamber Parliament, exercising supreme power, has raised Turkey up again. The chamber is elected for two years, and is always in session. This term is, perhaps, too long. A possible change may be that the full chamber should sit only for two months of the year, leaving a Standing Commission to carry on the Government for the rest of the time.

But already, however, the Times had questioned whether Turkey could genuinely be  Price stated "no one can meet this still young Chief of State without feeling respect and adniiration for his qualities", see Over-Seas Daily Mail, March 10, 1923, p.5.